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Abstract 
This paper quantifies labor law violations and how the enforcement efforts impact on the 
compliance level by considering the possibility of different labor regulations being violated 
simultaneously. The findings for the Peruvian labor markets over the period 2004-2013 indicate 
that: (i) multiple violations of labor regulations are an important feature of Peruvian labor 
markets; (ii) young workers, workers with low level of education, indigenous workers, workers 
in micro firms and workers employed in the agricultural sector have higher chances of being 
deprived of several labor benefits simultaneously; (iii) the enforcement of labor regulations, 
captured through the number of labor inspections at the region level, is effective in detecting and 
penalizing extreme situations of multiple violations of the labor law, but the evidence also 
suggests that firms adjust only partially as an attempt to reduce the amount of a potential fine if 
discovered, and that laid off workers during the adjustment process moved to the informal sector 
where firms are not inspected. These findings are useful from a policy perspective indicating that 
there is space to improve firms’ incentives when facing an increase in the enforcement effort. 
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1. Introduction 
Compliance with labor market rules in developing countries is generally low despite their 
extensive regulations (Ronconi, 2010). Last available household surveys for Latin American 
countries reveal that, on average, 40.6% of wage employees were deprived of a written labor 
contract, 42.2% didn’t receive the contributions to the pension system, while 37.4% didn’t have 
health insurance coverage associated to their job (SEDLAC, 2017). Imperfect enforcement of the 
labor law and weak institutions have been pointed out as potential explanations for the low level 
of compliance in developing countries (Loayza et al., 2005; Basu et al., 2010). Having 
unreasonably stringent labor regulations and taxes in general have also been found to be an 
important determinant of the compliance level in the developing world (de Soto, 1989; Loayza, 
1996; de Paula and Scheinkman, 2006). 
The effects of the enforcement of labor market regulations on the compliance level and other 
labor outcome variables have also been covered extensively by the literature. Empirical studies 
have found that higher enforcement of the labor law increases the compliance with labor market 
regulations (Ronconi, 2010; Almeida and Carneiro, 2012; Almeida et al., 2013) or does not 
generate any effect (Bhorat et al., 2012; Viollaz, 2018), increases the compliance among men 
and reduces the compliance among women (Viollaz, 2018), reduces firms’ size and possibly 
productivity (Almeida and Carneiro, 2009), decreases job creation and increases job destruction 
(Almeida and Poole, 2013), reduces de provision of non-mandated benefits (Almeida et al., 
2013), and generates wage adjustments -mainly reductions of formal wages at the top of the 
wage distribution and increases of informal wages (Almeida and Carneiro, 2012; Almeida et al., 
2013).  
All these papers have analyzed violations (or compliance) of only one labor regulation 
(Bhorat et al., 2012; Almeida and Carneiro, 2012) or violations of different regulations one at a 
time (Ronconi, 2010; Almeida et al., 2013; Viollaz, 2018; Viollaz, 2018). No work has been 
done on multiple violations of the labor law. A situation of multiple violations of labor 
regulations takes place when a worker is simultaneously deprived of more than one of the labor 
benefits he is entitled to.  
Two main questions are the focus of this paper. First, how the pattern of multiple violations 
varies over time and with worker, employment, and region characteristics. Second, how the 
enforcement of labor market regulations impacts the pattern of multiple violations. To answer 
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these questions, I explore microdata from Peruvian national household surveys for the period 
2004-2013 where workers report their own working conditions. Wage employees are entitled to 
several labor benefits in Peru. However, the compliance with labor market regulations is low, 
i.e., around 78% of workers were deprived of at least one of the labor benefits captured by the 
household survey in the analyzed period. Compliance with labor market regulations is monitored 
by a labor inspection system which is decentralized at the region level. I use information on the 
number of inspections carried out in each region of the country to construct an enforcement 
measure that I relate econometrically with the number of labor violations workers suffer. 
Previous evidence for Peru has shown that there was no impact of the degree of enforcement on 
the compliance level with labor regulations analyzed individually during 2008-2013 (Viollaz, 
2018). 
The mechanisms I analyze in this paper are the following. Firms decide whether to violate 
any labor regulation, and in that case, how many of them to violate, considering simultaneously 
the expected gains from evading any labor benefits established by law (labor costs savings 
mainly) which are specific of each benefit, and the expected costs (monetary fine in case of 
being detected by labor inspectors and difficulties to access to new markets) which varies with 
the labor benefit as well. Firms’ decide the optimal number of labor regulations to evade 
considering all these factors (expected gains associated to the evasion of each labor rule and the 
expected costs) given the technology, level of capital, market conditions, and the degree of 
enforcement of labor market regulations. The simultaneous nature of this decision is an 
important factor not considered by previous studies which are focused on the impact of the 
enforcement effort on the compliance with only one labor regulation or with different regulations 
analyzed separately. When enforcement increases, firms that were evading some labor rules may 
find it optimal to start complying with all or with some of them depending on the factors 
mentions above, i.e., technology, market conditions, etc. I expect this adjustment to impact on 
the pattern of multiple violations, for instance, reducing the probability of suffering the violation 
of many labor rules and, consequently, increasing the probability of suffering the violation of 
only few or none of them. Firms can use other margins of adjustment as well, such as the layoff 
of workers who can then find a job in the informal sector of the economy which is not inspected. 
This paper contributes to different strands of literature related to the non-compliance with 
labor market regulations and the enforcement of the labor law. First, this paper contributes to the 
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empirical literature quantifying labor law violations. As mentioned before, previous literature has 
been focused on the analysis of the violation of one labor regulation or different labor regulations 
considered one at a time. This paper considers the possibility of different labor laws being 
violated simultaneously. Second, this paper adds to the literature by analyzing the impact of the 
enforcement of labor regulations on the compliance with labor rules. Again, the literature here 
has been focused on the analysis of how changes in enforcement affect the compliance with one 
specific labor regulation or with different regulations considered separately. This paper 
contributes by analyzing how the pattern of multiple violations changes when the enforcement 
effort changes. 
The findings can provide insights for labor inspection and labor regulation design. The 
estimation of the effect of enforcement on the pattern of multiple violations can be informative 
about the incentives generated by different penalties associated to different labor violations. The 
lack of effect when analyzing how the compliance with individual labor regulations changes 
when the degree of enforcement varies may be hiding a more complicated pattern of adjustment. 
Non-compliant firms may start complying with some of the rules they were evading as a way to 
reduce the amount of the fine in case of being detected. In the final situation, the compliance 
level would be partial, but it could result in an improvement in terms of the number of benefits 
workers receive. 
 
2. Labor Market Regulations and Labor Inspection System in Peru 
2.1 Labor Protection 
In Peru, workers’ rights are established in the Political Constitution and protected by the labor 
inspection system led by the Ministerio de Trabajo y Promoción del Empleo (Labor Ministry or 
MTPE). Wage employees who are registered in the Planilla –the formal register of labor 
relationships, are entitled to several benefits. These benefits include a monthly wage equal or 
above the minimum wage; a maximum of 8 working hours a day and 48 hours a week; 
contributions to the health insurance and the pension system;1 a break of no less than 45 minutes 
a day; a minimum of 24 hours of rest time during the week; a paid maternity leave of 90 days 
and a paternity leave of four days; paid vacation time; family allowances; surcharge for night 
                                                          
1 Contributions to the pension system are completely paid by workers in Peru while employers have the obligation 
of enrolling employees into the system and deducting the contributions from the monthly wage.  
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shifts, compensation for length of service; and severance pay. All labor relationships must be 
established through a written contract. 
 
2.2 Labor Inspection System 
The labor inspection system in Peru has the objectives of monitoring the compliance with labor 
market and social security regulations in the private sector, give technical support and guidance 
on labor issues, and penalized the violations of the rules. 
 There is a central authority, the National Labor Inspection Office (DNIT in Spanish), one 
regional inspection agency in each of the 25 regions in the country (agency of high rank), and 
some zonal inspection agencies (agencies of low rank). The labor inspection functions of the 
regional agencies extend to each region’s territory. 
 Every year, the DNIT jointly to the regional governments plan the inspection activities, while 
regional inspection agencies carry out the labor inspections in each region territory. The planning 
of the inspection functions has been eased since the implementation of the electronic payroll 
system in 2008 (Rani, et al., 2013; Díaz, 2014; ILO, 2015). Similarly to other developing 
countries, labor inspections are focused on formal firms in Peru –those enrolled in the tax 
register. Informal firms receive orientation interventions regarding labor market regulations. 
 The resources of the labor inspection system in Peru are scarce (Weil, 2008). In 2009 the 
system had 406 labor inspectors for the entire country, only 6 of the 25 regions had a supervisor, 
and most labor inspectors were concentrated in the regions of Lima and Callao (Díaz, 2014; 
Julca Babarzy, 2013; Requejo Alemán, 2013). Human resources and equipment to carry out the 
inspections are provided by the Labor Ministry (MTPE in Spanish) and regional governments. If 
transport to arrive to the firms to be inspected are lacking, the MTPE and regional governments 
refund any transport expenses. However, the evidence indicates that transport expenses are 
reimbursed long after the labor inspections are carried out, or they are never covered (Requejo 
Alemán, 2013).  
 The violations of labor regulations are classified according to their severity –there are minor, 
serious and very serious violations. When a labor inspector detects a situation of non-compliance 
with labor regulations, the employer receives a proposal to solve the irregularity in certain period 
of time in exchange for a reduction in the penalty. The amount of the monetary fine depends on 
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the severity of the violation and on the number of workers affected. The total value of the 
monetary penalization has a maximum that has been established in 30 tax units.2  
 
2.3 Measure of Enforcement of Labor Market Regulations 
In this paper, I follow Viollaz (2018) and define the enforcement of labor market regulations as 
the number of labor inspections per hundred salaried workers employed in the private sector in 
each region and year, excluding domestic workers.3 Data on the number of labor inspections 
comes from the Ministerio de Trabajo y Promoción del Empleo. 
Figure 1 presents the number of inspections per hundred salaried workers during 2004-2013 
(Panel a) and the variation in the measure of enforcement across regions and over time (Panel b). 
The pattern of the enforcement of labor market regulations during the analyzed period was 
erratic (Panel a). There was an important reduction between 2004 and 2007, when the number of 
inspections per hundred workers fell from 2.5 to 0.9, a subsequent recovery, and a new declining 
trend from 2009 to 2013. The number of inspections per hundred salaried workers also shows an 
important variation across region and over time (Panel b). This is the variation I exploit in the 
econometric analysis. Between 2004 and 2005, the degree of enforcement decreased in most 
regions, and the rate of reduction was different across them. Regions with a higher level of 
enforcement to begin with exhibited the largest reductions, resulting in a change in the 
distribution of the enforcement effort across regions. In the other three sub-periods depicted in 
Figure 1 (2007-08, 2009-10, 2012-13), the annual changes in the enforcement measure were 
smaller but mixed, i.e., the enforcement effort increased in some regions while declined in some 
others. 
 The variability of the enforcement measure across regions is in line with expectations. First, 
labor inspections are leaded and carried out by regional agencies with jurisdiction in each region. 
The decentralization of the inspection activities jointly to the flexibility and discretion of labor 
inspectors in the Peruvian system (Piore and Schrank, 2008), may result in regional agencies 
pursuing different objectives and even to corruption practices. In fact, the low level of 
remuneration received by labor inspectors in Peru is considered a determinant of corruption 
                                                          
2 The tax units are units of reference used for tax purposes. For instance, the tax unit was set at 3700 nuevos soles in 
December 2013 (1329 USD). 
3 Domestic workers are not entitled to a minimum wages and their activity is not subject to labor inspections (Díaz, 
2014). 
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(Requejo Aleman, 2013). Second, labor inspection resources, i.e. number of labor inspectors and 
means of transportation, are unevenly distributed across regions (Díaz, 2014; Julca Babarzy, 
2013; Requejo Alemán, 2013).  
 
3. Patterns of violations of labor market regulation  
3.1 Sample and Variables Definition 
I use information from the Peruvian household survey (ENAHO) where workers report their own 
working conditions. The analyzed period extends from 2004 (some labor benefits were not 
captured by the ENAHO before 2004) to 2013 (some changes to the labor inspection system 
were introduced in 2013 and became operative in 2014).4 Information on labor benefits includes 
enrolment into the pension system and having a labor contract. Surveys also collect information 
on the number of hours of work during the last week and labor earnings that I compare with the 
legislated maximum of weekly hours of work and with the minimum wage respectively. The 
sample comprises wage employees from the private sector aged 15 to 65 (the legislated 
retirement age) and excludes domestic workers who are not entitled to a minimum wage and are 
not subject to labor inspections (Díaz, 2014). To compare the monthly labor income with the 
minimum wage, I consider the national minimum wage that was in place in the previous month 
each worker was interviewed; this data comes from the Ministerio de Trabajo y Promoción del 
Empleo. For workers in the agricultural and livestock sectors and for workers in the mining 
sector I use their specific minimum wages.5 For individuals working less than 4 hours a day, the 
minimum wage is proportional to the number of hours worked according to the Peruvian 
legislation. I include this adjustment in the calculations.  
With this information I construct indicator variables for whether a wage employee is 
suffering a violation of each labor benefit considered separately, and for whether a wage 
employee is suffering multiple violations of labor regulations. The measures of individual 
violations and of multiple violations are defined as follows. Let 𝑣𝑖
𝑗 be an indicator variable for 
                                                          
4 A central authority of the labor inspection system was created in 2013, the Superintendencia Nacional de 
Fiscalización Laboral or SUNAFIL. The SUNAFIL started operating in April 2014 and centralizes most inspection 
activities. This change in the distribution of labor inspection functions prevents from using year 2014 in the 
econometric analysis in Section 4, where I rely in the regional and time variation of the enforcement effort. 
5 The minimum wage in the mining sector is 25% higher than the national minimum wage (Order 030-89-TR). For 
workers employed in the agricultural and livestock sectors, the minimum wage is set in a daily base and grows at the 
same pace than the national minimum wage (Law 27360). I calculate the monthly minimum wage assuming full 
time workers, i.e., I multiple daily minimum wage * 5 days of work per week * 4.33 weeks in a month. 
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whether individual i is deprived of labor benefit j, where j could be enrolment into the pension 
system, having a labor contract, earning a wage equal or above the minimum wage, and working 
no more than the maximum weekly hours:  
𝑣𝑖
𝑗 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖
𝑗 = 0
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖
𝑗 = 1
 
(1) 
𝑉𝑗 is the measure of violation of  labor benefit j and is defined as the average value of 𝑣𝑖
𝑗 for the 
sample of wage employees:  
𝑉𝑗 =∑
𝑣𝑖
𝑗
𝑁
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
(2) 
𝕍𝑘 is the indicator of multiple violations of labor regulations and is defined as the average of an 
indicator variable for whether each individual i is deprived of k labor benefits, with k = 1,2,3,4:   
𝕍𝑘 =∑
𝐼𝑖
𝑘
𝑁
 
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
where 
𝐼𝑖
𝑘 =
{
  
 
  
 
1 𝑖𝑓 ∑𝑣𝑖
𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
= 𝑘
0 𝑖𝑓 ∑𝑣𝑖
𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
≠ 𝑘
 
 
(3) 
 
 
3.2 Patterns of Individual Violations of Labor Regulations 
In this sub-section, I describe the patterns of individual violations of labor market regulations 
distinguishing by worker characteristics, employment characteristics, and regions.  
Table 1 shows that on average, 38% of wage employees covered by the minimum wage 
earned below that level between 2004 and 2013 (column a). The level of minimum wage 
violation fell substantially over the period, from 42% in 2004 to 34% in 2013. The reducing 
trend was interrupted in 2011 and 2012, but resumed after that. The increase in the level of 
minimum wage violation coincided with a large rise in the real minimum wage and in the Kaitz 
index (ratio between the minimum wage and average labor income). The minimum wage 
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shortfall (column b) was 15%, while it reached 41% for those earning below the minimum wage 
level (column c).6  
The percentage of wage employees working more than the legal maximum of weekly hours 
was 34% on average. This share followed a declining trend over time, falling from 35% in 2004 
to 30% in 2013. The violation of the enrolment into the pension system was as high as 55% on 
average. However, the non-compliance with this regulation fell substantially from 61% in 2004 
to 48% in 2013. Finally, the share of workers without a labor contract was 52% on average, and 
decreased from 57% in 2004 to 47% in 2013. 
Panel A of Table 2 presents the results when the sample is broken down according to worker 
characteristics. Young workers (workers aged 14-17 and 18-24) are more likely to suffer from 
violations of labor regulations than their adult counterparts (workers aged 25-55 and 56-65). This 
result is in accordance to previous evidence for Peru and other Latin American countries (Cruces 
et al., 2017). Young workers usually begin their labor market career in positions where they do 
not have access to labor benefits, but it has been argued that they can potentially obtain training 
and experience for better jobs in the future that they could not get right out of school (Bosch and 
Maloney, 2010). This is true for the minimum wage, the enrolment into the pension system and 
labor contract regulations, and also for the minimum wage shortfall. For the maximum of weekly 
hours of work, results indicate that the non-compliance level is higher for workers aged 18-24 
and 25-55. There is no clear pattern of violation of labor market regulations by sex. The non-
compliance with the minimum wage regulation is larger among women, as is also the shortfall 
among workers earning below the minimum. The opposite occurs with the maximum hours of 
work per week and labor contract regulations, i.e. the non-compliance level is larger among men. 
The share of workers not enrolled into the pension system is roughly the same among men and 
women. Workers with higher levels of education are less likely to suffer from violations of labor 
market regulations. That is true for the minimum wage, pension and labor contract regulations, 
and also for the minimum wage shortfall. The non-compliance for workers with a superior level 
of education is less than half the value for workers with primary education. The only exception 
to this pattern is the maximum of weekly hours of work. The distinction by race shows that 
                                                          
6 The minimum wage shortfall is defined as the difference between the minimum wage and the earned monthly 
wage as a percentage of the minimum wage for people earning below the minimum, and takes the value zero for 
people earning equal or above the minimum. 
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indigenous workers suffer from higher levels of labor standard violations compared to non-
indigenous workers for all labor regulations considered.  
Panel B of Table 2 presents the results obtained when workers are grouped according to 
employment characteristics. The levels of violation of the minimum wage, pension and labor 
contract regulations decrease with the size of the firm where workers are employed. This is in 
line with expectations as large firms are more visible and can be subject to labor inspections with 
a higher probability than small firms. On the contrary, the pattern of non-compliance with the 
maximum hours of work regulation shows higher levels of violation for larger firms, although 
the discrepancies with firms of medium and small size are small. The distinction by economic 
sectors shows that more than half of agricultural workers face violations of minimum wage, 
pension or labor contract regulations, and a minimum wage shortfall of 51%. The non-
compliance with the hours of work regulation is the lowest for them compared to workers from 
other economic sectors. Services workers are the less affected compared to other sectors. Around 
one third of them earns below the minimum wage, works more than the maximum of weekly 
hours, is not enrolled into the pension system or does not have a labor contract. Labor standard 
violations for manufacturing and construction workers are in between the levels registered by 
agricultural and services workers. 
Labor standards violations also differ by region. Figure 2 shows that minimum wage 
violations range from a minimum of 23% in Callao to a maximum of 59% in Amazonas. There is 
also large heterogeneity in the minimum wage gap by region. Ica is the region with the lowest 
level of violation of the enrolment into the pension system with a non-compliance rate of 30%. 
At the other end of the scale, the share of not enrolled workers is as high as 74% in Amazonas. 
For the labor contract regulation, Callao is again the region with the best performance, with 38% 
of its workers without a labor contract. The maximum level of non-compliance with the labor 
contract regulation is 67% in Amazonas. Finally, the lowest violation to the hours of work 
regulation is found in Cajamarca where the non-compliance rate is 17%, while the maximum is 
in Madre de Dios with a non-compliance rate of 39%. Besides the regions located at the 
extremes of the violation space (Callao and Amazonas mainly), other regions with low levels of 
non-compliance with labor laws are Lima, Ica and Moquegua. These regions, jointly to Callao, 
belong to the urban coast area of the country. Among the regions with high non-compliance 
levels, Apurimac and San Martin share with Amazonas the highest positions in the ranking of 
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violations of labor regulations. These regions belong mainly to the jungle area, both rural and 
urban, and to the rural mountain area of the country.  
 
3.3 Patterns of Multiple Violations of Labor Regulations 
The statistics presented in the previous sub-section showed a general pattern of low compliance 
with the labor law in Peru between 2004 and 2013. The four labor regulations considered were 
violated for at least one third of the workers in the sample when they were analyzed separately. 
The next questions refer to the pattern of multiple violations of labor regulations in Peru. What 
was the share of workers for whom the four labor regulations considered were violated? What 
was the share of workers receiving only one, two or three of the labor benefits? What was the 
share receiving all of them? 
Table 3 shows the distribution of workers according to the number of violations of labor 
regulations they suffered. During the period 2004-2013, around 71% of workers in the sample 
were deprived of one, two or three out of four labor benefits covered in the survey. Specifically, 
29% of workers bore three violations of labor regulations, 20% suffered the violation of two of 
the four labor regulations, and 22% suffered the violation of one labor law over the period. The 
remaining workers are mainly in the zero violations category, 22%, while 7% did not receive any 
of the four labor benefits (four violations).   
The pattern of multiple violations changed over time. The shares of workers suffering the 
violation of three or four labor regulations fell between 2004 and 2013, while the shares being 
deprived of none, one or two labor benefits increased. Figure 3 presents the variations over time. 
The largest changes were the reduction in the share of workers reporting three violations (drop of 
10 percentage points) and the increase in the share with zero violations of the labor law (rise of 7 
percentage points). 
The pattern of multiple violations of the labor law differs according to worker characteristics. 
Table 4 presents the results in Panel A. There is a negative relation between age and the number 
of labor regulations being violated as expected. The shares of young workers (aged 14-17 or 18-
24) deprived of three or four labor rights are larger than the shares of adult workers (aged 25-55 
or 56-65) in a similar situation. For instance, 66% of workers aged 14-17 suffered the non-
compliance with three labor regulation, while that figure was 23% for workers aged 25-55. There 
is no clear pattern of multiple violations by gender. The shares of women without any violations 
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of the labor laws and with four violations are larger than the shares of men. For one, two, and 
three violations, the shares of men surpass the shares of women. There is a negative relation 
between the number of violation and the level of education. For instance, the share of workers 
with high level of education suffering zero violations is 40% while the share suffering four 
violations is 2%. The corresponding figures for workers with low level of education are 5% and 
11% respectively. Indigenous workers are more deprived from labor benefits than non-
indigenous workers. The shares of indigenous workers suffering two, three or four violations of 
labor regulations are larger compared to the shares of non-indigenous workers. At the other end 
of the scale, the shares of workers with zero or one violation of the labor laws are larger for non-
indigenous workers compared to indigenous workers. 
Panel B of Table 4 presents the pattern of multiple violations by employment characteristics. 
Following the evidence in previous sub-section, the pattern tends to improve with the size of the 
firms where workers are employed. The shares of workers with zero or one violation of the labor 
laws are larger for workers in large firms compared to small firms, and for workers in small size 
firms compared to workers in micro firms. On the contrary, the shares of workers suffering three 
or four violations of the labor laws decrease with the size of the firm. Workers from agriculture 
and construction sectors suffer more violations of the labor law compared to workers from 
services and manufacturing: 78% of agricultural workers and 69% of construction workers are 
deprived from two, three or four labor benefits. These figures are 57% and 46% for 
manufacturing and services workers respectively. 
Figure 4 shows the regional variation in the number of violations of labor regulations. The 
share of workers suffering four violations of the labor law is small in general, and hardly 
surpasses 10% (11% in Lambayeque). There is a large variability in the share of workers 
deprived of three out of four labor benefits. Ica is the region with the smallest share (17%), while 
Amazonas has the maximum value, with half of its workers suffering three violations of the labor 
law. The share of workers with two violations of labor market regulations ranges from a 
minimum of 12% in Huancavélica to a maximum of 23% in Madre de Dios. Finally, Amazonas 
and San Martín –regions that belong to the jungle area of the country- have the smallest shares of 
workers with one and zero violations of the labor rules respectively (11% and 15%). Ica and 
Moquegua are at the other end of the scale with the largest shares of workers with one and zero 
violation of labor rules (31% and 32%).   
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All in all, the pattern of multiple violations of labor regulations shows that most workers 
receive some of the labor benefits considered, i.e. the share of workers suffering four violations 
is small, but very few of them receive all of them, i.e. the share of workers with zero violations is 
also very small. This result reveals that firms do not restrict their choices to comply with all the 
regulations or to not comply with any of them. Some potential factors affecting this decision is 
the way the labor inspection system works, imposing different monetary fines depending on the 
severity of the violation detected and assigning a cap to the total penalty a non-compliant firm 
pays. Next section analyses these potential factors in more detail.  
 
4. Impact of Enforcement of Labor Regulations on the Pattern of Multiple Violations  
4.1 Theoretical Discussion 
In a context of imperfect enforcement, as is the case of Peru, a profit maximizing firm can decide 
to comply with all labor market regulations (perfect compliance), to comply with only some of 
them (partial compliance), or to evade all the labor rules (non-compliance). There is a benefit for 
evading labor regulations (labor costs savings), but there are also some costs (the monetary fine a 
firm has to pay if discovered not complying with the labor rules and the potential difficulties to 
access to new markets or to improve technology). Evasion of labor regulations can also be 
explained by lack of information (Schrank, 2013). Although unintended, non-compliant firms 
due to lack of knowledge/information are also obtaining a benefit in the form of reduced labor 
costs. 
A pattern of partial compliance can be explained by the different net benefit associated to the 
evasion of each labor rule. Each labor benefit implies a different labor cost for a firm, and the 
fine in case of being discovered depends on the severity of the violation in Peru, which differs 
according to the labor regulation considered and on the number of workers affected. For 
instance, the non-compliance with the minimum wage regulation is a very serious violation, 
while the non-compliance with the enrolment into the pension system is considered a serious 
violation. Additionally, there is a maximum to the total fine a firm pays in Peru. I expect a firm 
to decide the optimal mix of labor regulation to evade and the number of workers affected as a 
function of the specific labor cost being saved and on the potential monetary fine given the 
technology, level of capital, market conditions, and the degree of enforcement of labor market 
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regulations. The optimal decision may be to violate all labor regulations, to violate only some of 
them, or not to violate any labor rule. 
An increase in the enforcement effort may have an impact on this decision because it implies 
an increase in the expected costs of evading the labor rules –due to a higher probability of being 
discovered and fined (deterrence effect). Thus, an increase in compliance is expected when the 
degree of enforcement increases. Considering an initial situation of partial compliance or non-
compliance, the deterrence effect may imply a reduction in the probability of suffering any 
violation and a final situation of perfect compliance. However, the characteristics of the 
inspection system in Peru, where the monetary fine for not complying with the labor rules 
depends on the labor rights being violated and the number of workers affected, may generate 
incentives to adjust only partially (fine reduction effect). An increase in enforcement may 
generate a reduction in the probability of suffering a large number of violations to the labor rules, 
and an increase in the probability of suffering the violation of only some of them.7 For instance, 
a firm violating the minimum wage regulation and other labor rights can adjust and start paying 
above the minimum to avoid being penalized for a very serious violation. In the final situation, 
the compliance is partial, but there was an improvement in terms of the number of labor rights 
being violated.  
There are some secondary effects associated to a stricter level of enforcement. The increased 
compliance due to the higher probability of detection translates into higher labor costs for a firm. 
Firms may lay off workers as an adjustment mechanism. A possible associated effect is that 
workers who lose their jobs may offer their hours of work in the informal sector of the economy, 
where firms are not inspected (movement into the informal sector effect). The movement into the 
informal sector will depend on workers’ valuation of the benefits being enforced and may lead to 
a growth in the share of workers not covered by labor benefits. 
Summing up, several forces are at play when analyzing the impacts of a stricter level of 
enforcement. First, the deterrence effect can generate an increase in the compliance with all or 
some of the labor rules being violated. Second, because fines depend on the severity of the 
violation and on the number of workers affected, the increased compliance may be only partial, 
implying a reduction in the probability of suffering the violation of several labor benefits and an 
increase in the probability of suffering the violations of only some of them. Third, laid off 
                                                          
7 Similarly, a firm can adjust by reducing the number of workers affected by the violation. 
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workers may find a job in the informal sector of the economy, increasing the non-compliance 
with the labor rules. For all these reasons, the impact of an increase in enforcement may differ 
with the number of violations considered. In the next sub-section, I will estimate the effect of a 
change in an enforcement measure on the probability of suffering multiple violations of labor 
regulations. The results will show the net effect of all these forces and I will be able to identify 
which one dominates. In an additional exercise, I will try to disentangle the movement into the 
informal sector effect from the fine reduction effects.  
 
4.2 Econometric Strategy 
This sub-section estimates the causal impact of enforcement of labor regulation on the patterns of 
multiple violations described previously. To this end, a set of four probit regression models are 
estimated where the dependent variables are indicators of the number of labor regulations being 
violated. The regression equations take the following form: 
Pr(𝑌𝑖𝑟𝑡
𝑗 = 1|𝑋 = 𝑥𝑖𝑟𝑡) = Φ(𝑥𝑖𝑟𝑡𝛽)          𝑗 = 1,2,3,4 (4) 
The dependent variable 𝑌𝑖𝑟𝑡
𝑗  takes the value 1 if person i located in region r in year t suffers the 
violation of j labor regulations, with j taking the value 1 to 4 (the number of regulations covered 
by the Peruvian ENAHO), and 0 otherwise. X is a vector of explanatory variables, 𝛽 are the 
parameters to be estimated, and Φ(. ) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. 
The vector of explanatory variables includes the enforcement measure presented in section 2.3, a 
set of individual, employment and region characteristics. Specifically, the measure of 
enforcement is defined as the logarithm of the number of labor inspections per hundred salaried 
workers in region r and year t. The set of individual characteristics includes sex, indicator 
variables for age groups, indicator variables for level of education, years of tenure, and indicator 
variables for whether or not the person is indigenous or lives in an urban area. The employment 
characteristics considered are the size of the firm where each worker is employed, indicator 
variables for sector of activity, an indicator variable for whether the firm uses the accounting 
books required by the tax authority (proxy for the formality status of the firm), and the Kaitz 
index calculated for each economic sector and year. The region characteristics are the 
unemployment rate, the fiscal result as a share of total fiscal incomes, the logarithm of the per 
capita household income, and the logarithm of the number of orientation orders in each region 
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and year. The model also includes region and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at 
the region level. 
 The enforcement measure may be endogenous in this setting for at least two reasons. First, 
the compliance with labor market regulations can have an impact on the level of enforcement, 
i.e. low compliance levels may lead authorities to increase the enforcement effort. Second, the 
enforcement measure can be correlated with unobserved institutional and development time-
varying variables at the region level, which are not captured by region fixed effects. To deal with 
these potential sources of endogeneity I instrument the enforcement variable with a measure of 
the arrival cost of labor inspectors to the firms, as in Viollaz (2018). The instrument is based on 
the way the Peruvian labor inspection system works. Labor inspectors travel by car from the 
regional agency to the firms to be inspected in some location of the same region. The extension 
of the region road network and the traffic in the network contain information on the arrival costs. 
One the one hand, a wider road network should be associated to a higher geographic dispersion 
of firms, increasing the cost of arrival. On the other hand, a larger number of vehicles in the road 
network should increase the arrival cost as well. Let 𝑅𝑁𝑟𝑡 be the extension of the region road 
network (national plus regional roads) in kilometers divided by the region territory, 𝑇𝑟𝑡 be the 
number of per capita crossing vehicles in the road network in region r and year t. The arrival cost 
is defined as the logarithm of the number of per capita crossing vehicles per kilometer of the 
ratio territory–region road network:  
𝑍𝑟𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑅𝑁𝑟𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑡). (5) 
A possible threat to this instrumental variable strategy is that the extension of the road network 
and the traffic may be capturing the development level of each region, violating the exclusion 
restriction of the instrument. I expect to be capturing the development level with the region fixed 
effects and regional regressors with variation over time (unemployment rate, fiscal result as a 
share of total fiscal incomes, and the logarithm of the per capita household income).8  
 I present the results of the first stage in Table 5 for different specifications. Column (1) 
controls for individual characteristics, region and year fixed effects. Column (2) adds 
employment characteristics, while Column (3) includes region characteristics. The arrival cost 
measure is negative and highly significant in all specifications. Furthermore, estimates are quite 
                                                          
8 Regional inspection agencies are based in the main cities of each region (e.g. capital city) where a large share of 
firms is expected to be located. A measure of the geographic dispersion of firms would improve the instrument as an 
arrival cost measure. However, I do not expect the lack of this information to affect the validity of the instrument. 
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stable across models and indicate that for each 1% of increase in the arrival cost measure, the 
enforcement effort declines in around 0.16%-0.18%. To put these values in context, the average 
annual change in the arrival cost measure was 6.9%, meaning a reduction in the enforcement 
level of 1.10%-1.24%. 
 
4.3 Estimation results 
Table 6 provides the estimated average marginal effects from probit models (4) when controlling 
for the measure of enforcement of labor regulations, individual, employment and region 
characteristics. Table A1 in the Appendix presents the results for the pobit models without 
instrumenting the enforcement measure.  
 The effect of the enforcement measure –the logarithm of the number of labor inspection 
orders per hundred workers, on the probability of suffering violations of the labor law is not 
monotonous, changing from positive to negative when the number of violations increases. First, 
there is a negative impact on the probability of suffering four violations of labor regulations 
(significant at 1% level). Specifically, a 10% increase in the enforcement effort leads to an 
average reduction of 0.5 percentage points in the probability of being deprived of four labor 
rights. This is in accordance to expectations; when the enforcement effort increases, non-
compliant firms perceive a higher chance of being detected and fined. A complementary 
explanation is in the educating role of labor inspections. Firms may evade labor regulations 
because of lack of information and labor inspectors can fill this gap (Schrank, 2013). Second, 
there is a positive impact of an increase in the degree of enforcement on the probability of 
suffering one or three violations of labor regulations (significant at 10% level) –average 
increases of 0.7 and 0.3 percentage points for each 10% of increase in the enforcement measure. 
Two different forces may be at play here. One the one hand, firms may choose to comply with 
some of the labor rules they were evading, but not with all of them (fine reduction effect). This 
strategy, where the final compliance levels is partial, can be explained as an attempt to reduce the 
amount of the potential fine in case of being caught by labor inspectors and by the financial 
difficulty of complying with all the rules. On the other hand, workers who were laid off in the 
adjustment process may offer their hours of work in the informal sector of the economy, 
increasing the share of workers suffering one or three violations of labor regulations (moving to 
the informal sector effect). The following sub-section intends to disentangle these two forces.  
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4.4 Additional Results 
I obtained additional results by estimating previous models for firms using and not using the 
accounting books required by the tax authority separately. I will be using this information as a 
proxy for firms’ formality status. With these estimations I will try to separate the part of previous 
findings that is explained by the fine reduction effect from the part explained by the movement 
into the informal sector effect. 
 Results are presented in Table 7 for formal firms (Panel A) and informal firms (Panel B). 
Estimates show that the previous reduction in the probability of suffering four violations of labor 
regulations as a result of an increase in enforcement is only present for formal firms. The reason 
is simple. The deterrence effect of labor inspections only applies to formal firms which are the 
subject of inspections. The increase in the probability of suffering three violations of labor 
regulations is found in informal firms only. The impact on formal firms is in fact negative, 
although not significant. This finding indicates that the movement into the informal sector effect 
is dominating over the fine reduction effect. Some workers are moving into the informal sector, 
probably after being laid off from a formal position. There is a reduction in the probability of 
suffering two violations for workers in informal firms. This result cannot be interpreted as a 
deterrence effect of labor inspections (informal firms are not subject to inspections and fines in 
the Peruvian system), but could be explained by the guidance/information role of labor 
inspectors in informal firms. Finally, there is an increase in the probability of suffering one 
violation of labor regulations in formal firms which is close to be significant at 10% level. This 
increase can be explained by the fine reduction effect, i.e., an increase in the enforcement effort 
leads to a reduction in the probability of suffering four violations of labor regulations in formal 
firms and a simultaneous increase in the chances of suffering only one. Firms start complying 
with some of the rules they were evading, but the final level of compliance is partial.   
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has made two important contributions to the empirical literature quantifying labor law 
violations and how the enforcement of the labor law can have an impact on the compliance level 
by considering the possibility of different labor regulations being violated simultaneously.  
First, descriptive results over the period 2004-2013 revealed that multiple violations of labor 
regulations are an important feature of Peruvian labor markets. More than half of wage 
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employees were deprived of two or more labor benefit during the analyzed period, and while 
most workers receive some of the labor benefits covered by household surveys (the share of 
workers suffering four violations was small), very few receive all of them (the share of workers 
with zero violations was also very small). The patterns of multiple violations by worker and 
employment characteristics showed that young workers, workers with low level of education and 
indigenous workers have higher chances of being deprived of several labor benefits 
simultaneously –three or four. Similar results were found for workers in micro firms and workers 
employed in the agricultural sector.  
Second, previous evidence has shown that enforcement of labor market regulation is not 
effective in Peru when analyzing the compliance with different labor benefits one at a time. This 
paper found that the enforcement effort has an impact on the pattern of multiple violations of 
labor regulations. On the one hand, the labor inspection system is effective in detecting and 
penalizing situations of multiple violations of the labor law, i.e., the probability of being 
deprived of four labor benefits falls when enforcement increases. This effect is explained by the 
deterrence effect of labor inspections in formal firms. On the other hand, the impact on the 
probability of suffering one or three violations of the labor law is positive, suggesting that firms 
adjust only partially as an attempt to reduce the amount of a potential fine if discovered, and that 
laid off workers during the adjustment process moved to the informal sector where firms are not 
inspected. 
These findings are useful from a policy perspective. They indicate that the inspection system 
has been successful in identifying extreme situations of non-compliance with labor rules, i.e., 
there is a reduction in the probability of suffering four violations. However, there is still space to 
improve firms’ incentives when facing an increase in the enforcement effort, i.e., the 
combination of different penalties depending on the labor regulation being violated and the cap 
to the total monetary fine. Despite the perceived increase in the probability of being discovered 
by labor authorities, the evidence has shown that firms stick to partial compliance. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Violations of labor market regulations 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Encuesta Nacional de Hogares. 
Notes: Minimum wage in local currency unit of 2005. Kaitz index defined as the ratio between monthly minimum 
wage and average monthly labor earnings. 
 
Table 2: Violations of labor market regulations by worker and firm characteristics 
Average 2004-2013 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Encuesta Nacional de Hogares. 
Violation    
(a)
Shortfall  
(b) (c)=(b)/(a)
2004 42.42 18.50 43.60 464.02 0.70 35.33 60.99 56.89
2005 44.43 19.80 44.55 458.16 0.70 35.78 63.74 57.59
2006 42.49 19.23 45.25 490.54 0.70 35.33 59.97 55.70
2007 40.42 17.01 42.08 481.30 0.66 34.36 56.14 53.65
2008 38.93 15.30 39.29 488.87 0.67 35.43 55.56 51.85
2009 33.53 13.56 40.44 486.85 0.62 33.71 52.65 51.00
2010 31.32 12.51 39.93 478.68 0.61 33.32 52.22 52.79
2011 34.38 12.46 36.24 519.05 0.66 32.26 49.71 49.71
2012 35.90 13.35 37.18 579.75 0.69 30.49 48.02 47.35
2013 33.79 12.55 37.15 587.09 0.68 29.64 47.80 47.34
Average 37.76 15.43 40.57 503.43 0.67 33.56 54.68 52.39
Minimum wage Hours of 
work Pensions
Labor 
contract
Minimum 
wage
Kaitz          
index
Violation    
(a)
Shortfall  
(b) (c)=(b)/(a)
Panel A
Group of age
     [14,17] 76.17 42.54 0.56 25.66 99.62 97.06
     [18,24] 50.40 20.74 0.41 34.21 77.37 68.15
     [25,55] 29.59 10.75 0.36 34.13 43.80 43.23
     [56,65] 32.95 13.61 0.41 26.05 32.05 42.62
Gender
     Women 44.51 18.62 0.42 26.24 53.13 46.38
     Men 32.71 12.75 0.39 37.06 53.76 54.55
Level of education
     Primary 62.76 30.31 0.48 29.43 81.32 84.91
     Secondary 41.59 16.61 0.40 41.03 65.60 66.61
     Superior 23.42 7.83 0.33 26.37 31.73 24.95
Race
     Non-indigenous 35.29 13.59 0.39 32.06 49.13 47.69
     Indigenous 43.57 19.60 0.45 32.67 62.81 60.96
Panel B
Size of firm
     [1,10] 55.87 25.39 0.45 34.31 83.67 89.23
     [11,100] 29.17 9.50 0.33 36.90 50.17 44.16
     [101, +) 15.16 3.33 0.22 42.33 18.46 11.67
Economic sector
     Agriculture 61.30 31.23 0.51 22.93 74.54 77.40
     Manufacturing 32.22 11.27 0.35 45.24 53.50 53.37
     Construction 27.79 11.50 0.41 32.58 63.05 74.34
     Services 32.86 11.78 0.36 32.91 46.17 40.36
Minimum wage Hours of 
work Pensions
Labor 
contract
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Table 3: Multiple violations of labor market regulations 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Encuesta Nacional de Hogares. 
 
 
Table 4: Multiple violations of labor market regulations by worker and firm characteristics 
Average 2004-2013 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Encuesta Nacional de Hogares. 
 
 
  
Zero 
violations
One    
violation
Two 
violations
Three 
violations
Four 
violations
2004 19.39 18.32 18.62 34.47 9.19
2005 16.79 19.28 19.12 35.20 9.60
2006 19.06 19.90 18.08 34.42 8.54
2007 20.82 21.18 18.88 30.86 8.26
2008 21.01 22.13 18.66 30.45 7.74
2009 23.86 21.99 19.97 27.70 6.48
2010 22.69 23.11 21.48 27.31 5.42
2011 23.06 24.71 20.88 25.84 5.51
2012 25.33 23.84 20.29 24.78 5.76
2013 26.15 23.45 21.10 24.22 5.07
Average 21.82 21.79 19.71 29.52 7.16
Zero 
violations
One    
violation
Two 
violations
Three 
violations
Four 
violations
Panel A
Group of age
     [14,17] 0.07 1.17 15.75 66.21 16.81
     [18,24] 8.69 15.20 24.70 40.15 11.26
     [25,55] 27.70 26.07 18.80 22.63 4.81
     [56,65] 33.98 25.11 17.80 19.49 3.62
Gender
     Women 26.97 20.27 16.76 27.49 8.51
     Men 19.81 23.36 21.64 29.32 5.87
Level of education
     Primary 4.57 9.51 20.20 54.40 11.33
     Secondary 10.97 18.97 23.77 36.79 9.49
     Superior 40.12 29.93 15.81 11.60 2.53
Race
     Non-indigenous 24.75 23.92 19.60 25.84 5.89
     Indigenous 17.71 17.77 20.15 35.51 8.85
Panel B
Size of firm
     [1,10] 2.84 8.12 25.11 51.00 12.93
     [11,100] 21.32 28.04 23.83 22.53 4.27
     [101, +) 38.05 43.31 12.49 5.26 0.88
Economic sector
     Agriculture 9.08 12.41 18.05 54.16 6.29
     Manufacturing 17.92 24.68 20.95 28.02 8.42
     Construction 10.47 20.75 32.97 32.17 3.64
     Services 29.16 24.58 18.05 21.17 7.03
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Table 5: Enforcement of labor market regulations and arrival cost of labor inspectors 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Encuesta Nacional de Hogares and Ministerio de Trabajo y Promoción del 
Empleo. 
Notes: OLS estimations. RN: sum of national and regional roads/region territory. T: per capita crossing vehicles. 
Robust standard errors clustered at the region level between parentheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, 
* significant at 10%. 
 
 
Table 6: Average marginal effects of a probit model for the probability of suffering one, two, three or 
four violations of labor regulations. Instrumental variables estimation 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Encuesta Nacional de Hogares and Ministerio de Trabajo y Promoción del 
Empleo. 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the region level between parentheses. Enforcement measure instrumented 
by a measure of the arrival cost of labor inspectors. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
  
Dependent variable:
log(RN*T) -0.155 -0.155 -0.169
(0.0504)*** (0.0502)*** (0.0497)***
Region and Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Employment characteristics No Yes Yes
Region characteristics No No Yes
Observations 83,322 83,322 83,322
R-squared 0.794 0.795 0.800
Enforcement measure
One 
violation
Two 
violations 
Three 
violations
Four 
violations
Enforcement measure
Log of #inspections per 100 workers 0.067 -0.037 0.029 -0.050
(0.036)* (0.061) (0.017)* (0.025)**
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employment characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 83,322 83,322 83,322 83,322
Predicted probability 0.206 0.225 0.329 0.078
IV Probit
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Table 7: Average marginal effects of a probit model for the probability of suffering one, two, three or 
four violations of labor regulations. Formal and informal firms. Instrumental variables estimation 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Encuesta Nacional de Hogares and Ministerio de Trabajo y Promoción del 
Empleo.  
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the region level between parentheses. Enforcement measure instrumented 
by a measure of the arrival cost of labor inspectors. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
 
  
One 
violation
Two 
violations 
Three 
violations
Four 
violations
A) Formal firms:
First stage result
log(RN*T) -0.192
(0.0595)***
Second stage result
Log of #inspections per 100 workers 0.103 0.043 -0.026 -0.048
(0.063) (0.101) (0.038) (0.018)***
Observations 42,257 42,257 42,257 42,257 42,257
R-squared 0.815
Predicted probability 0.317 0.200 0.166 0.044
B) Informal firms:
First stage result
log(RN*T) -0.152
[0.0433]***
Second stage result
Log of #inspections per 100 workers 0.019 -0.098 0.076 -0.023
0.021 (0.056)* (0.044)* 0.043
Observations 41,065 41,065 41,065 41,065 41,065
R-squared 0.791
Predicted probability 0.061 0.260 0.546 0.122
Log of 
#inspections 
per 100 workers
Dependent variable:
Number of labor regulations being violated
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: Pattern of enforcement of labor market regulations over time and across regions 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Ministerio de Trabajo y Promoción del Empleo. 
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Figure 2: Violations of labor market regulations by region 
Average 2004-2013. In percentages. 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Encuesta Nacional de Hogares. 
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Figure 3: Multiple violations of labor market regulations over time 
Average 2004-2013. In percentages. 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Encuesta Nacional de Hogares. 
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Figure 4: Multiple violations of labor market regulations by region 
Average 2004-2013. In percentages. 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Encuesta Nacional de Hogares. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Average marginal effects of a probit model for the probability of suffering one, two, three or 
four violations of labor regulations.  
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Encuesta Nacional de Hogares and Ministerio de Trabajo y Promoción del 
Empleo.  
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the region level between parentheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant 
at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
One 
violation
Two 
violations 
Three 
violations
Four 
violations
Enforcement measure
Log of #inspections per 100 workers 0.005 -0.006 0.019 0.000
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009)** (0.005)
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employment characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 83,322 83,322 83,322 83,322
Predicted probability 0.206 0.225 0.329 0.077
Probit
